ABSTRACT Chameleon authentication tree (CAT) is an important authenticated data structure for verifiable data streaming in 5G networks. But the typical CAT cannot support the dynamic scenario very well because it cannot expend freely since its height is fixed. Therefore, we proposed a dynamic CAT (DCAT) with the feature of adaptive expansion. We divided the algorithms of the DCAT with the following phases: setup, append, query, and verification. The DCAT removes the drawbacks of the static CAT. In the setup phase, it is not required for the scale of the tree to be determined, and the scale of the tree can be adaptively expanded during the data-appending phase. Therefore, the DCAT can suit the data stream environment better. During the data querying phase, the average authentication path length has been reduced, which leads to less space requirement and better verification efficiency. Finally, we performed theoretical analysis and drew a comparison between the static CAT and the DCAT in terms of performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fifth generation (5G) networks support as much as a 1000-fold increase in capacity compared to existing networks. Therefore, 5G will become a cornerstone of connectivity in future applications made possible by the progressive implementations of the Internet of Things as well as Smart Cities concepts. Specifically, 5G will be subjected to new requirements in terms of the security and privacy imposed by upcoming applications such as verifiable data streaming [1] , [2] . Other examples include the air information collected by environmental sensors, including temperature, pressure and PM2.5 values, as well as stock quotes and DNA flows generated by the DNA computing servers in medical areas. All the information mentioned above can be viewed as data streaming, which can be seen as an unlimited sequence of data continuously generated by a source over time. Each data unit in it can be a numeric value, a file or a frame. And the source can only store a small state as the stream goes by, so it has to outsource the stream to the servers in networks to store the data and answer the query from the user. Only the correct answer can be used by the user, so the problem of integrity verification for data streaming (also referred to as verifiable data streaming, VDS) [3] - [6] has become very popular in academia.
The model of verifiable data streaming is shown in Figure 1 . The model consists of three parts: the data source, servers and users. The data source constantly produces data streaming and sends it to the server. The servers have three main functions: storing the data, dealing with the query from users and sending the corresponding proof along with the answer to the users. The users can verify the integrity of the answer with the proof. 
A. RELATED WORKS
The VDS problem is similar to the problem of the verifiable database (VDB), which was proposed by Benabbas et al. [7] . The difference between VDS and VDB is that VDB normally does not consider the order of the elements, which is very important in VDS. Other verification problems in both VDS and VDB almost remain the same. Studies on VDB are mainly based on authenticated data structures [8] - [13] . In 2000, Monietc proposed the methods of certificate revocation and update in order to solve the problem of data authentication using a digital signature [14] . In 2004, Martel et al. proposed a general model of authenticated data structure [8] . However, all these methods rely on assumptions of weak security and cannot be proved (such as the q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption). In 2011, the method of verification of large data sets proposed by Benabbas et al. [7] and the vector commitment proposed by Catalano and Fiore [15] mainly focus on the verification of values of specific data types [16] - [19] (such as polynomials) instead of values of any data type. Therefore, they are unsuitable in the streaming setting. Furthermore, other schemes [20] - [23] , in which the amount of data has a linear growth rate instead of an exponential growth rate, are also unsuitable for the streaming setting, which may contain a very large amount of data. In addition, the schemes are not publicly verifiable.
Schroder and Schroder [3] put forward a concept of verifiable data streaming. They used the chameleon hash function to construct a static chameleon authentication tree (CAT) and constructed a verifiable data streaming scheme (VDS) using the CAT [24] , meeting the requirements of integrity verification for data streaming. However, in this scheme, the scale of the chameleon authentication tree has to be determined in advance, which means the amount of data supported is fixed. And this scheme also failed to solve the VDS problem. Schroder and Simkin proposed a fully dynamic CAT [25] to solve the problem mentioned above. In their approach, the fully dynamic CAT is more efficient than CAT and allows the data owner to upload an unbounded amount of data, in which the new root is defined through a deterministic function that is applied to a fixed value in the public key and depends on the current depth of the tree. However, the proof is only given in the random oracle model, and the construction requires the additional inversion property of chameleon hash functions. And in this scheme, the algorithms of DCAT are not given in detail.
B. CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we conducted research on the integrity verification of data streaming and achieved the following: We proposed DCAT, which is able to overcome the shortcomings of the CAT, and designed the key algorithms for the DCAT including setup, append, query and verify.
• First, we construct DCAT, and the scale of the DCAT does not need to be determined, as it can be adaptively expanded when appending new data to the tree.
• Second, DCAT always keeps the smallest depth to accommodate the current data. Since it does not generate unnecessary nodes, it is more efficient than the present CAT scheme. When the DCAT is queried, the authentication root, which returns the authentication path (also known as the proof), is the root of the smallest sub tree containing the target leaf. So, the authentication path of the DCAT is shorter than that in the CAT. This means more space and improved efficiency for data verification.
• Finally, we carried out contrast experiments comparing the performances of DCAT and CAT using pseudorandom data streaming. The result indicates that the performance of our scheme is greatly improved compared with the CAT in the append, query, and verify phases.
C. ORGANISATION OF THE PAPER
The organisation of the rest of the paper is as follows:
In section 2, we outline some preliminaries used in this paper. In section 3, we give the details of the proposed DCAT. In sections 4 and 5, we analyse the security and the performance of the proposed DCAT to show its advantages compared with CAT. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. CHAMELEON HASH FUNCTION
The chameleon hash function is a special kind of hash function that is collision-resistant. However, it has a trap door, with the help of which a collision can be found easily.
Definition 1:
The chameleon hash function is a tuple of three PPT algorithms CH = (chamGen, Ch, Col).
chamGen(1 λ ): The key generation algorithm. The input is 1 λ , and the output is the key pair (cpk, csk) of the chameleon hash function where csk and cpk are polynomials related to the security parameter λ.
Ch(cpk, m, r): The algorithm for calculating the chameleon hash value. The inputs are the public key, the message m ∈ {0, 1} in and a random value r ∈ {0, 1} λ , and the output is the hash value Ch(cpk, m, r) ∈ {0, 1} out .
Col(csk, m, r, m ):
The algorithm for calculating the chameleon hash collision. The inputs are the private key, the message m, the random value r and a new message m , which need to match the collision. The output is a random value r = Col(csk, m, r, m ) that matches m and satisfies Ch(cpk, m, r) = Ch(cpk, m , r ). In other words, (m, r) and m , r are one collision pair.
The hash value Ch(cpk, m, r) is equally distributed, and it is unrelated to the selection of (cpk, m, r). Furthermore, the chameleon hash function must be collision-resistant, which means one cannot find a pair of (m 0 , r 0 ) and (m 1 
In other words, the adversary cannot construct a pair of collisions without knowing the private key of the chameleon hash function. As long as the adversary is not able to acquire a pair of collisions, the property of collision-resistant is established. However, in the current chameleon hash scheme, if the adversary knows a pair of collisions (m 1 , r 1 ) and (m 2 , r 2 ), he will be able to construct another collision (m 3 , r 3 ) satisfying
which forms a security problem that needs to be considered when using the chameleon hash function. The chameleon hash function can be constructed in many ways, e.g., the discrete logarithm problem.
B. THE STATIC CHAMELEON AUTHENTICATION TREE
The static chameleon authentication tree (CAT) introduced in [3] is an authentication tree that has the ability to authenticate an exponential number of 2 D leaves where D is fixed in the setup phase in advance and where D = poly(λ). The owner of a trapdoor can authenticate a new element on demand without pre-or re-computing all other leaves.
The CAT is a triple of three efficient algorithm CAT = (catGen, addLeaf , catVrfy): a generation algorithm catGen, a path generation algorithm addLeaf that adds a leaf to the tree and returns the corresponding authentication path, and a path verification algorithm catVrfy that checks if a certain leaf is part of the tree.
The CAT in [1] supports two security properties: structurepreserving and one-wayness. Loosely speaking, an adversary adv should not be able to change the structure of the CAT, which means that changing the sequence of the leaves or substituting any leaf should be a successful attack. Furthermore, an adv should not be able to add further leaves to a CAT.
III. DYNAMIC CHAMELEON AUTHENTICATION TREE
A. FORMAL DEFINITION Definition 3: Dynamic chameleon authentication tree (DCAT) can be described by a tuple of four PPT algorithms DCAT = (dcatGen, dcatAppend, dcatQuery, dcatVerify).
dcatGen(1 λ ): The setup algorithm takes the security parameter λ as the input, and the output is the public/private key pair (cpk, csk) ← chamGen(1 λ ) of the chameleon hash function. The algorithm first generates the user's public/private key pair (spk, ssk) and initializes both the database DB and the tree structure catStruct. After initialization, the algorithm returns (csk, ssk, catStruct) as secret key sk and (cpk, spk) as public key pk. dcatAppend(sk, data): The append algorithm uses the private key sk to append the data data to the DCAT and updates the private key sk using the new structure information dcatStruct.
dcatQuery(i):
The algorithm for querying the ith element d [i] in the DCAT. If the querying is successful, the algorithm returns the data and the corresponding authentication path auth i along with the output 1; otherwise, it returns the output 0.
dcatVerify(pk, i, data, auth): The verify algorithm is to confirm whether data is the ith element in the DCAT. If so, the algorithm returns the output 1; otherwise, it returns 0.
In a DCAT, for any i ≤ n(n is the current data size in the DCAT), if (data i , auth i ) ← dcatQuery(i) and dcatVerify(pk, i, data i , auth i ) → 1, we consider the DCAT to be complete.
B. SECURITY DEFINITION
A DCAT scheme is considered to be secure if it satisfies the following two properties:
(1) The adversary is not able to change the structure of the DCAT, which means he cannot modify or replace any leaf node, especially the order of the leaf nodes (data elements of the data streaming). This property is called the structurepreserving property.
(2) The adversary is not able to append data to the DCAT by himself without being caught. This property is called the one-way property.
We now describe the structure-preserving property in detail using an example of an interactive game between a challenger and an adversary A.
The challenger generates the public/private key pair (sk, pk) and gives the public key pk to adversary A. Then, A sends data elements
After receiving the data elements, the challenger appends them to the DCAT and sends back the authentication paths for these data elements (auth 1 , auth 2 , auth 3 , ...., auth q(λ) ) to A. If A tries to break the structure of the DCAT, he has to generate an authentication path for a data element that is not in the tree, as follows:
Setup: The challenger runs dcatGen(1 λ ) to calculate the private key sk and the public key pk and then sends pk to the adversary A.
Streaming: The adversary A chooses q pieces of data ele-
and sends them to the challenger. The challenger first uses dcatAppend(sk, d i ) to append the data elements to the dynamic chameleon authentication tree and then uses auth i ← dcatQuery(i) to send back the corresponding authentication paths to the adversary A. We can represent the response sequence as Q :=
Output: The adversary generates outputs (d * , i * , auth * ). If the outputs satisfy 1 ≤ i * ≤ q(λ), (l * , i * , auth * ) / ∈ Q and dcatVerify(pk, i * , d * , auth * ) = 1, the adversary A wins the game.
Adv sp A is the probability of the adversary A winning the game.
Definition 4: For any value of q and any PPT adversary A, if the probability Adv sp A is negligible, the DCAT is considered to be structure-preserving.
We now describe the one-way property below by using a similar game.
Setup : The challenger runs dcatGen(1 λ ) to calculate the private key sk and the public key pk and then sends the public key pk to adversary A.
Streaming : Adversary A chooses q pieces of data elements
and sends them to the challenger. The challenger first runs dcatAppend(sk, d i ) to append the data elements to the dynamic chameleon authentication tree and then runs auth i ← dcatQuery(i) to send back the corresponding authentication paths to the adversary A. We can represent the response sequence as
Output: Finally, the adversary generates outputs (d * , i * , auth * ). If the outputs satisfy q(λ) ≤ i * and dcatVerify(pk, i * , d * , auth * ) = 1, the adversary A wins the game.
Let Adv sp A be the probability of adversary A winning the game.
Definition 5: For any value of q and any PPT adversary A, if the probability Adv sp A is negligible, the DCAT is considered to be one-way.
C. DESIGN IDEA
Although the DCAT has many improvements compared with the CAT, they have similar structures, as shown in Figure 3 . In DCAT, all the right child nodes (labeled as the blue nodes in Figure 3 ) use the chameleon hash function to calculate their hash values, while all the left child nodes and root nodes (labeled as the [-] nodes) use the normal hash function instead. All the top-left nodes (labeled as the ρ x nodes in Figure 3 ) sign the hash values and therefore can be used as the authentication root node.
As described above, the root node of the whole dynamic chameleon authentication tree uses the normal hash function to calculate the hash value, while the root node of the static chameleon authentication tree uses the chameleon hash function instead. Therefore, the dynamic chameleon authentication tree will have one less chameleon hash node than the static chameleon authentication tree. As a result, the structure we designed for the dynamic chameleon authentication tree will not obey the rule that each leaf node has one corresponding chameleon hash node (mentioned in the paper on the static chameleon authentication tree).
However, it is feasible for the dynamic chameleon authentication tree, and the reason for this will be explained in detail below. Note that, for the static chameleon authentication tree, each leaf node has one corresponding chameleon hash node, and the root node is correlated to the first leaf node. In comparison, except for the first leaf node, the dynamic chameleon authentication tree has the same one-to-one correspondence between the leaf nodes and the chameleon hash nodes.
After initialization, the dynamic chameleon authentication tree has an empty structure, while the static chameleon authentication tree generates the root node. Since the dynamic chameleon authentication tree will not generate the root node until the first data appending process, it is not necessary to calculate the hash collision using the chameleon hash function. As a result, it is feasible for the dynamic chameleon authentication tree to use the normal hash function to calculate the hash value of the root node. In order to have a dynamic structure, we need to consider the expansion of the tree, which is the reason we use the normal hash function to calculate the hash value in the root node. After each expansion, it is important for the structure to remain consistent. According to Figure 2 , the dynamic chameleon authentication tree can be divided into four states by the dotted lines. For each state, the structure of the whole dynamic chameleon authentication tree remains the same: All the left child nodes and the root nodes use the normal hash function to calculate the hash values, while all the right child nodes use the chameleon hash function instead.
Considering the first leaf node, it is a special node because it is not only a leaf node but also an authentication root node. Since the root node of the whole dynamic chameleon authentication tree is a normal hash node, the first leaf node does not have a corresponding chameleon hash node. However, this is not a problem for the dynamic chameleon authentication tree; after initialization, the dynamic chameleon authentication tree has an empty structure; that is, no authentication root node is required at this point since there is nothing in the tree. When we append data to the tree for the first time, we can use the normal hash function to calculate the hash value of the node and use it as the authentication root node. As a result, for the first data appending process, it is not necessary to generate a chameleon hash node as the root node and calculate the collision for it. Aside from the differences mentioned above, both the dynamic and the static chameleon authentication trees share the same structure. The term dynamic in the dynamic chameleon authentication tree indicates that the scale of the tree is not fixed and can adaptively expand in order to support the increasing data size over time. Figure 3 illustrates a dynamic chameleon authentication tree with three different scales. When the first data element is appended to the tree, the depth of the tree is D = 1, which means the capacity of the tree is 2 D−1 = 1. If we try to append the second data element, the tree needs an expansion since it is already fully saturated. After the expansion, the depth of the tree is D = 2, indicating that the tree can now support 2 D−1 = 2 data elements. Therefore, we can append the second data element to the tree. When appending the third data elements, the situation is similar to the previous one, and the tree expands again. After the second expansion, the depth of the tree is D = 3, and the capacity of the tree is increased to 2 D−1 = 4 data elements. As a result, we can successfully append the third data element to the tree.
The description above explained how the depth of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree is increased with the expansions in order to support more data. For each expansion, the depth of the tree is increased by 1, and the capacity of the tree is doubled. As a result, the frequency of the expansions will not be high since the scale of the tree can grow very fast with a few expansions.
According to Figure 3 , the structure of the tree remains consistent during the process. Specifically, after each expansion, the previous tree is used as the left sub tree of the new dynamic chameleon authentication tree. Such a property can speed up the expansion process and lead to a better authentication path (proof) when querying data in the tree.
D. ALGORITHMS OF DCAT
The construction method of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree is different from the one from the static chameleon authentication tree since they have slightly different structures.
During the setup phase, unlike the static chameleon authentication tree, the dynamic chameleon authentication tree does not need to determine the scale of the chameleon tree, and the dynamic chameleon authentication tree can expand itself if the current tree is fully saturated when appending data. Therefore, it avoids the situation of not having enough space for the appending data. The main algorithms of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree are described below.
1) SETUP
dcatGen(1 λ ): Let (spk, ssk) be the public/private key for the user, H : {0, 1} → {0, 1} len be the normal collisionresistant hash function and CH = (chamGen, Ch, Col) be the chameleon hash function.
In the setup phase, the dynamic chameleon authentication tree does not need to determine its depth. After initialization, the structure of the tree is empty, and the depth of the tree is 0. In later phases, the depth of the chameleon authentication tree will be dynamically increased according to the size of the appending data.
The setup algorithm returns both the public key and the private key. The public key contains the public key of the chameleon hash function and the public key of the user. The private key contains the private key of the chameleon hash function, the private key of the user and the structure of the chameleon tree. After the setup phase, the dynamic chameleon authentication tree is empty, which means there is no hash node or data element.
2) APPEND
dcatAppend(sk, data): The data appending algorithm. The purpose of this algorithm is to append the data data to the dynamic chameleon authentication tree. In this aspect, the dynamic chameleon authentication tree and the static chameleon authentication tree have both similarities and differences. First, they have different structures. In order to support a dynamic scale, unlike the static chameleon authentication tree, the dynamic chameleon authentication tree must be able to expand itself. After the setup phase, the structure of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree is empty with no existing node.
When appending the first data element, we need to expand the scale of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree for the first time: The depth of the tree is increased to 1, which means that the tree can now hold 2 l−1 = 1 data elements and the root node is the first leaf node at the moment. Then, the algorithm calculates the hash value of the first data element and stores it in the leaf node. Since the leaf node is also the root node, the leaf node signs the hash value using the private key ssk of the user, and the signature is stored in the root node. At this point, the appending process of the first data element is finished, and the dynamic chameleon authentication tree is structure-preserved as described in section 3.2.
If we try to append the second data element to the dynamic chameleon authentication tree, since the tree is already fully saturated and cannot hold any more data elements, it needs to be expanded. In order to expand the dynamic chameleon authentication tree, we simply generate a new root node and set the previous root node (in this case, the first leaf node) to be the left child of the new root node. After that, a dummy chameleon hash node is generated as the right child of the new root node. The hash value of the dummy chameleon hash node is calculated using a random pair of m dummy , r dummy . Then, we use the new data element to calculate the chameleon hash collision in the dummy chameleon hash node and update the random number of the dummy chameleon hash node.
When we continue to append the third data element, the dynamic chameleon authentication tree requires another expansion. After the appending process, the structure of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree is illustrated in Figure 5 . As shown in the figure, a new authentication root node is generated along with two chameleon hash nodes and a normal hash node (the 3rd leaf node).
The hash value of the third data element is calculated using the normal collision-resistant hash function and then stored in the third leaf node. The next step is to merge the hash value of the third leaf node with its brother nodes and use it as the input to calculate the chameleon hash collision for its parent node. Next, we update the random number of its parent node. Due to the expansion in scale when appending the third data element, we also need to update the hash value of the root node and sign it. After appending the data element, the structure dcatStruct of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree is also updated along with the private key sk ← (csk, ssk, dcatStruct) .
The above algorithm can be divided into the following steps.
The first step is to determine whether the dynamic chameleon authentication tree needs to be expanded by checking if the current tree is fully saturated. If an expansion is required, a new root node is generated.
Then, we travel the dynamic chameleon authentication tree downwards from the root node until reaching the leaf node where the new data element needs to be appended. During the trip, if there is any node missing along the path, we generate a new one in that position. Therefore, when we reach the end, the dynamic chameleon authentication tree should have a complete structure. The next step is using the appending data element to either update the hash value of the corresponding hash node or calculate the chameleon hash collision and update the random number of the corresponding chameleon hash node.
Finally, if the dynamic chameleon authentication tree is expanded during the process, we need to sign the hash value of the newly generated root node using the private key of the user. In terms of data querying, the dynamic chameleon authentication tree is similar to the static chameleon authentication tree. However, because they have slightly different tree structures, there are some differences in the data query algorithms.
As illustrated in Figure 5 , there are five data elements in the dynamic chameleon authentication tree. If we try to query for the no.4 data element, we need to begin the process from the root node ρ 3 . According to binary representation, the location of the no.4 data element is 4 − 1 = 011 2 (minus 1 because we count the leaf nodes from 0), where 0 represents left and 1 represents right. Therefore, the directions of the path from the root node to the target leaf node are left, right and right. VOLUME 5, 2017 However, the authentication path is recorded from ρ 2 , which means, in this case, we begin recording the authentication path when we go right for the first time. The reason we start recording the path from ρ 2 instead of from the root node of the tree ρ 3 is there are multiple authentication root nodes in the dynamic chameleon authentication tree.
Imagine that before the no.5 data element is appended, node ρ 3 has not been generated, and the authentication path to the target leaf node starts from the root node ρ 2 . After an expansion of the tree, i.e., the no.5 data element is appended, we can still use the same authentication path in order to query the no.4 data, which means the authentication path always remains fixed regardless of how the tree expands. Therefore, in this way, the authentication path is shorter compared to the authentication path that begins with the root node of the whole tree, which leads to less time and space being consumed.
As a result, when querying data, the dynamic chameleon authentication tree uses the root node of the smallest possible sub tree that contains the target leaf node as the start point of the authentication path, and the first direction of the path will always be right.
The next step is to append the hash values of the brother nodes of the target leaf node to the authentication path. Note that if we pass through a chameleon hash node along the path, we need to append the random number of the chameleon hash node to the authentication path as well in order to calculate the corresponding chameleon hash value.
Finally, after reaching the target leaf node, we obtain the corresponding data from the database. If the query process is successful, the algorithm returns the data and the corresponding authentication path; otherwise, it returns 0.
The data querying algorithm is described below.
4) VERIFY

dcatVerify(pk, i, data, auth):
The data verification algorithm. The purpose of the algorithm is to verify whether the data data is the ith data element in the DCAT by using pk, auth. The algorithm returns 1 if the verification is successful; otherwise, it returns 0. For data verification, the dynamic and static chameleon authentication trees are very similar, but there is one difference between them: The dynamic chameleon authentication tree uses a normal hash node as the authentication root node, while the static chameleon authentication tree uses a chameleon hash node instead. For the dynamic chameleon authentication tree, the data verification can be divided into 3 parts.
1. Verifying whether the signature of the hash value of the root node is valid.
2. Calculating a hash value using the data and the authentication path and then checking whether it is consistent with the hash value of the authentication root node.
3. Verifying if the data exists in the correct position of the tree based on the authentication path.
In detail, by using the data data, we calculate the hash value for each node along the authentication path one by one from the leaf node to the authentication root node. Each time we obtain the hash value of a node, we compare it with the hash value of the corresponding node in the dynamic chameleon authentication tree. According to the structure of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree, the left child node is always a normal hash node, and the right child node is always a chameleon hash node. Therefore, during the verification process, we know whether the current node is a left child node or a right child node. As a result, after we have reached the authentication root node, we can verify whether the data data is in the correct location of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree. 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In order to prove the security level of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree, we can assume a game against an adversary A who has sufficient computing power. The adversary appends q := q(λ)(with linear growth rate) data elements to the dynamic chameleon authentication tree, which can be represented as d 1 , d 2 , d 3 , ..., d q . Therefore, the depth of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree D = poly(λ) has a linear growth rate as well. For adversary A, the structure dcatStruct of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree is a secret since it is a part of the private key, which he cannot obtain. We say that the adversary A wins the game if he is able to obtain a tuple (d * , i * , auth * ) / ∈ Q satisfying dcatVerify(pk, i * , d * , auth * ) = 1. We will discuss the security level of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree under two circumstances: 1 ≤ i * ≤ q and i * > q. In the first circumstance, 1 ≤ i * ≤ q; in order for the adversary to win, he needs to break the structure-preserving property of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree, which means he has to find a collision for the normal hash function or for the chameleon hash function. However, it is contrary to the hypothesis that the hush functions used in the dynamic chameleon authentication tree are collision-resistant.
In the second circumstance, i * > q, the adversary wins if he can break the one-way property of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree. Therefore, the adversary has to either generate a chameleon collision or find a chameleon collision in the dynamic chameleon authentication tree, which also contradicts the hypothesis.
Theorem 1:
If H is a collision-resistant hash function and CH is a collision-resistant chameleon hash function, the dynamic chameleon authentication tree is structurepreserving.
Proof: By contradiction, if the dynamic chameleon authentication tree is not structure-preserving, there exists an adversary A with sufficient computing power who can win the game mentioned above with non-negligible probability. We will illustrate how to construct an algorithm B that can either find a collision of the normal hash function (denoted by B H ) or find a collision of the chameleon hash function (denoted by B CH ). Since the two circumstances are similar, we will only discuss algorithm B H .
Setup: Algorithm B H s treats adversary A as a black box, and A outputs a leaf data sequence l 1 , l 2 , ..., l q . Then, B H uses the sequence provided by A to construct a dynamic chameleon authentication tree. The last step is to query every data and to send back the path Q :=
Calculate the collision:
We denote the path from leaf node l * , which contains data d * , to the root node by path * , the path from the i * th leaf node to the root node by path i * and the path of the i * th data element by auth i * . The problem can be divided into two circumstances.
In the first circumstance where path * = path i * , because the two paths share the same root node, there exists j where 1 ≤ j ≤ depth satisfies path * .sub(j + 1) = path i * .sub(j + 1) and path * .sub(j) = path i * .sub(j)s (path.sub(j) represents the sub path start from node j along the path). Therefore, we have found a collision because
However, since path
, it is contrary to the assumptions that all the hash functions are collision-resistant. In the second circumstance where path * = path i * , if l i * = l * , we have found a collision. On the other hand, if l i * = l * , auth * and auth i * must be different since if auth * = auth i * , (d * , i * , auth * ) ∈ Q is against the assumptions. Suppose there is a j where auth * From the discussion above, we can conclude that the probability of adversary A breaking the structure-preserving property of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree is negligible. As a result, the dynamic chameleon authentication tree is structure-preserving.
Theorem 2:
If H is a collision-resistant hash function and CH is a collision-resistant chameleon hash function, the dynamic chameleon authentication tree is one-way.
Proof: By contrast, to break the one-way property of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree, the adversary A has to construct a hash node, which does not exist in the dynamic chameleon authentication tree, and find (d * , i * , auth * ) / ∈ Q, where i * > q. This means he can obtain a hash collision (either a normal hash collision or a chameleon hash collision). So, the dynamic chameleon authentication tree is one-way if H and CH are both collision-resistant hash functions.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON A. COST ANALYSIS AND COMPARISONS
The dynamic chameleon authentication tree is developed based on the static chameleon authentication tree, which has improvements in the structure and the corresponding algorithms. It has many advantages compared to the static chameleon authentication tree, such as better efficiency when appending, querying and verifying data. In this section, we will focus on the average number of hash values required to be updated during the data appending process and the average length of the authentication path during the data querying process of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree.
First, the dynamic chameleon authentication tree solves the problem of limited data space since its scale can be adaptively expanded, and therefore it is more suitable for integrity verification of data in the data streaming environment. In the setup phase, the structure of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree is initialized with no node generated, while the static chameleon authentication tree needs to determine the depth of the tree as well as generate a root node.
The dynamic chameleon authentication tree is also very efficient for appending data. Except for the first leaf node, each leaf node has one unique corresponding chameleon hash node. This unique chameleon hash node is the node that needs to be updated when appending data to the corresponding leaf node. When we append the first leaf node to the dynamic chameleon authentication tree, the first leaf node is also the root node, which means we only need to update one hash value. In comparison, when we try to append the first leaf node to the static chameleon authentication tree, the corresponding chameleon hash node to the first leaf node is the root node, which means we need to update D hash values, where D is the depth of the tree. In this case, the dynamic chameleon authentication tree is more efficient than the static chameleon authentication tree since it requires less updates for the hash values.
However, each time we expand the dynamic chameleon authentication tree, we need to update the hash value of the root node. Therefore, on average, if we try to expand a dynamic chameleon authentication tree to the same scale as a static chameleon authentication tree with depth D, we will need to expand D times. As a result, when appending data, the average required frequency of updating the hash values for VOLUME 5, 2017 both the dynamic chameleon authentication tree and the static chameleon authentication tree can be considered the same.
Aside from the update frequency of the hash value, another factor that we need to consider is the number of new nodes that are generated during the process. In general, if we expand a dynamic chameleon authentication tree to the same scale as a static chameleon authentication tree, both trees will generate the same number of nodes. However, the nodes in the static chameleon authentication tree are generated earlier, in the setup phase, than the ones in the dynamic chameleon authentication tree, which are generated only when required. As a result, the dynamic chameleon authentication tree is better in this respect.
In conclusion, the average cost of both the static and dynamic chameleon authentication trees can be considered the same for the data appending process.
The average number of updates required for the dynamic chameleon authentication tree when appending data is called the average update length, which can be calculated as:
The average update length converges to 2 as the depth of the tree continues to grow.
When querying data, the length of the generated authentication path of the static chameleon authentication tree is the depth D of the tree, while that of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree is the depth of the smallest possible sub tree that contains the target leaf node. On average, the length of the authentication path of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree when querying data can be calculated as:
The average length of the authentication path converges to depth − 1 as the scale of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree continues to expand. In contrast, the length of the authentication path of the static chameleon authentication tree is fixed to D, which is the depth of the tree.
B. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
By creating a test environment using 32-bit Windows 7, 4G RAM and an E7500 CPU, we conducted a series of tests focused on the performances of the processes of data appending, data querying and data verification for both the static chameleon authentication tree and the dynamic chameleon authentication tree. For each test, we used 32 bytes of pseudo random data as one data element, and the results are shown below.
In the first test, we initialized the depth of the static chameleon authentication tree to 21 and recorded both the average update length and the average update time, which is the average time taken for the data appending process, as shown in Figure 7 -10.
According to Figure 7 and Figure 8 , at the beginning, there is a great gap between the average update lengths of both the dynamic and the static chameleon authentication trees, and then they tend to be consistent. The results follow the theoretical analysis in earlier sections. For the static chameleon authentication tree, the depth D of the tree is determined in the setup phase, and therefore, the cost of the first few data appending operations is larger than that of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree. Since the dynamic chameleon authentication tree has the feature of adaptive expansion, it will never be fully saturated, and the average update length can be considered as 2 at all times.
In order for the static chameleon authentication tree to support more data, it requires a larger depth in the setup phase, which will lead to even larger differences between the costs of the first few appending processes for both dynamic and static chameleon authentication trees. After the first few appending processes, the average update length tends to be 2 for the static chameleon authentication tree. Since the scale of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree is adaptive, the amount of data in the tree always matches the current scale (depth) of the tree. Therefore, the average update length of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree tends to be 2 as well when appending data.
The comparison between the average update time for both the dynamic and the static chameleon authentication trees is illustrated in Figure 10 and Figure 11 . The average update time should be proportional to the average update length since both the dynamic and the static chameleon authentication trees share a very similar structure. According to the figures, the average update time is more stable for the dynamic chameleon authentication tree since the curve is flatter. After appending data to the trees, the next test is focused on the data querying process. The time taken for the querying data has a small and consistent value for both dynamic and static chameleon authentication trees. However, the average lengths of the authentication paths (proofs) show a significant difference. When querying data, the dynamic chameleon authentication tree uses the root node of the smallest possible sub tree for data verification, while the static chameleon authentication tree uses the root node of the whole tree. As a result, the average length of the authentication path is shorter in the dynamic chameleon authentication tree than the one in the static chameleon authentication tree. According to Figure 11 and Figure 12 , the average length of the authentication path of the static chameleon authentication tree is always equal to depth D, which is determined in the setup phase. In contrast, the average length of the authentication path of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree grows with the expansion of the tree. The figures clearly indicate that the average length of the authentication path of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree is much shorter compared to that of the static chameleon authentication tree.
As a result, when querying data, the dynamic chameleon authentication tree utilizes much less space than the static chameleon authentication tree. In addition, in the worst case scenario -where the dynamic chameleon authentication tree keeps expanding until it has the same scale as the static chameleon authentication tree -the average length of the authentication path will still be shorter by 1 according to the analysis in section 6.1.
FIGURE 13.
The average time of data verification using 32-byte data.
FIGURE 14.
The average time of data verification using 1MB data. Figure 13 and Figure 14 illustrate that the average time for data verification has very little difference for both the dynamic and the static chameleon authentication trees. Surprisingly, the verification time is not proportional to the lengths of the corresponding authentication paths. According to the discussion of the previous test, when a small amount of data has been appended to the trees, the authentication path of the static chameleon authentication tree is longer than that of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree. However, the exceeding part of the authentication path is formed by normal hash nodes whose hash values are calculated using the normal hash function. Since the normal hash function costs a lot less time than the chameleon hash function, the time required for the exceeding part is very short. As a result, the average time taken for the data verification process of the dynamic chameleon authentication tree is similar to or slightly less than that of the static chameleon authentication tree.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a dynamic chameleon authentication tree with multiple improvements based on the static chameleon authentication tree. The dynamic chameleon authentication tree is not required to predetermine the data size, and it has the feature of adaptive expansion. Therefore, it is more suitable for the data stream environment where the data size is considered to be unlimited instead of fixed. We designed the algorithms for the dynamic chameleon authentication tree including data appending, data querying and data verification, which are proven to be more efficient and less space-consuming compared to that of the static chameleon authentication tree. Finally, we conducted several experiments in order to compare the performances of both the dynamic and the static chameleon authentication trees. The results indicate that the dynamic chameleon authentication tree not only solves the problem of fixed data size but also exhibits many improvements in terms of time and space consumption. 
